If someone falls off of a 14th story roof, very predictably death will result. The conditions under which readers appear to infer such predictable outcomes were examined with three different retrieval paradigms: immediate recognition test, cued recall, and priming in word recognition. On immediate test, responses to a word representing the implicit outcome (e.g., dead) were slow, but on delayed test these responses were slow or inaccurate only when primed by an explicitly stated word. However, the word expressing the predictable outcome did function as an effective recall cue. Results suggest that readers encode these inferences into memory only minimally, but that they can make use of a cue word that represents the inference (e.g., dead) both at the time of an immediate test and in delayed cued recall.
The focus of this article is on the variables that govern the inference processes that occur during reading. In general, whether a reader makes a particular inference depends on what kind of inference it is and on the conditions of encoding, and whether the inference is useful at a later time depends on the conditions of retrieval at that time. The experiments in this article investigate inferences about predictable events and the conditions under which those inferences can be observed in retrieval.
Inferences about predictable events were chosen for two reasons. First, they can be made very compelling: If someone falls off a 14th story roof, the probability is very high that the result will be death. Thus, given a sentence about such a fall, it would seem likely that readers would infer the predicted event, death. If readers are ever going to make inferences about predictable events, then they should do so in cases like this.
The second reason inferences about predictable events were chosen was that they seemed relatively intermediate between the kinds of inferences that it has been shown that readers do make and the kinds that it appears readers do not make. Up to now, the inferences that readers have been shown to make are inferences that are required for integration of the explicitly stated information in a text. For example, probably the most well-documented inferences that readers make are inferences involving the repetition of an argument across different propositions. Such inferences include the recognition that two instances of a word in different propositions are referencing the same concept (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980b) , that a pronoun or other anaphor and its antecedent are referencing the same concept (Chang, 1980; Clark & Sengul, 1979; Corbett, 1984; Corbett & Chang, 1983; Dell, McKoon, & Ratcliff, 1983; Garrod & Sanford, 1977; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980a , 1980b , This research was supported by National Institute of Health Grant HD18812 to Gail McKoon and National Science Foundation Grant BNS 82 03061 to Roger Ratcliff. We wish to thank Al Corbett and Jan Keenan for comments on an earlier version of this article.
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and that a concept must be added to a proposition because it is missing from the explicit surface structure but is needed to establish argument repetition (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980b) . Readers also appear to make inferences involving causal relations, where one event explicitly stated in a text is connected by a causal inference to another explicitly stated event (Keenan, Baillet, & Brown, 1984) .
In contrast, the kinds of inferences that readers do not make are less involved in integration of explicitly stated information. For example, Alba and Hasher (1983) , in a recent review, suggest that there is little empirical support for schema theories that predict large numbers of various kinds of inferences during reading. Seifert, McKoon, Abelson, and Ratcliff (in press) found that the connection between two stories that share the same abstract thematic structure is not automatically inferred. Corbett and Dosher (1978) found that readers did not infer the instruments of verbs, and McKoon and Ratcliff (1981) found that instruments were inferred only if they were highly semantically related to the verb. Singer and Ferreira (1983) found that readers did not make causal inferences unless the consequence of the to-be-inferred event was explicitly stated. This summary of recent research does not lead to a definite prediction about whether readers will infer predictable events. On the one hand, these inferences are not required to integrate explicitly stated text. On the other hand, the highly predictable nature of the events may cause subjects to infer them, just as semantic relatedness may cause instruments of verbs to be inferred .
Examples of the materials used in the experiments are shown in Table 1 . Each item is made up of two sentences and a single test word. One of the sentences (to be called the predicting sentence) predicts an event that can be described by the test word. The other sentence (the control sentence) uses as many as possible of the same words as the predicting sentence, but does not predict the event.
The question of whether or not readers make the inference represented by the test word, given the predicting sentence, is not simple because the answer will depend on how the question is asked experimentally. Thus, the second goal of the experiments In Experiment 1, the retrieval condition was immediate test. The procedure was that a paragraph was presented to be read, and then immediately after reading, a word was presented for recognition. Subjects were instructed to decide, yes or no, whether the test word had appeared in the paragraph just read. When the paragraph was one of the predicting or control sentences, then the test word was the word predicted by the predicting sentence (e.g., dead) and the correct response was no, because it had not appeared in the sentence. The hypothesis was that, if subjects understood the relation between the predicting sentence and the test word, then a correct response to the test word would be difficult and so slow and/or inaccurate. The immediate test procedure has been used previously (cf. Corbett & Chang, 1983; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980a) , but only to look for facilitation of positive responses. A finding of inhibition of negative responses will extend the usefulness of the procedure.
In Experiment 2, the retrieval test was cued recall. Subjects read predicting and control sentences to rate them according to how interesting they were (an incidental task), and then were given an unexpected cued-recall test. The cues for recall were the test words used in Experiment 1 (e.g., dead), and the hypothesis was that subjects would be able to use the relation between these words and predicting sentences to benefit their recall performance.
In Experiments 3 and 4, the retrieval test was speeded item recognition, using a study-test procedure. In the study phase of each trial, paragraphs were presented and in the test phase, words were presented for recognition, with response time and accuracy measured. Each target word was preceded by a priming word, either a neutral word {ready) or a word from one of the studied paragraphs. In the conditions of interest, the studied paragraphs were either predicting or control sentences, the target word was the predicted word (e.g., dead), and the prime was either ready or a word referring to the main character in the sentence (e.g., actress). If the predicted event was inferred and encoded into the memory representation when the predicting sentence was studied, then correct (no) responses to the target word should be slow and/or inaccurate, with both primes.
The three retrieval tests each allow different conclusions about inference processes. These conclusions can be directly compared because the same materials are used in each experiment. For example, if the inference "the actress died" were explicitly encoded during reading, then with both the immediate test and the speeded item-recognition test, correct negative responses would be difficult, and with the cued-recall test, the cue dead would aid recall. On the other hand, if the inference was not encoded at all during reading, then correct negative responses might still be difficult with immediate test (because the inference might be made when the test word was presented) and the cue might still aid recall (because the cue might aid in generating information that matches the encoded text), but correct negative responses in the item-recognition test would not be slow or inaccurate.
Experiment 1
The experimental materials were single sentences such as the examples shown in Table 1 (the whole set is shown in the Appendix). There were also filler texts; some were single sentences and some were short paragraphs three or four sentences in length. Thus, across the experiment, the lengths of the materials varied from one sentence to four sentences.
Reading was self-paced, with each text presented one sentence at a time. Subjects pressed the space bar on a CRT terminal to initiate each text, and then, when they had finished each sentence, pressed the space bar to see the next sentence. After the last sentence of a text, a single test word was presented for recognition. Because the texts varied in number of sentences, subjects did not know when to expect the test word.
Method
Subjects: The 48 subjects in the experiment participated in order to receive extra credit in an introductory psychology course.
Materials. Thirty-two pairs of experimental paragraphs are shown in the Appendix. One paragraph of each pair predicted a particular event with a high probability; the event was describable by a single negative test word, usually a verb. The other paragraph of the pair used as many as possible of the same words as the first paragraph, but it did not predict the event. Words in the first paragraph that were judged by the experimenters to be semantically associated to the predicted event were used in the second paragraph. The experimental paragraphs were always single sentences and varied in number of words from 10 to 28 and in number of lines, when presented on a CRT screen, from 1 to 3.
There were also 112 filler paragraphs, which did not predict any particular event. Each of these had a single test word. The fillers included 16 single-sentence paragraphs each with a positive test word, 32 threesentence paragraphs each with a negative test word, 32 four-sentence paragraphs each with a negative test word, 16 three-sentence paragraphs each with a positive test word, and 16 four-sentence paragraphs each with a positive test word.
Procedure. Each subject was tested in one 50-min session. Presentation of stimuli and collection of data were controlled by a microcomputer driven by the Dartmouth time-sharing computer.
Each subject was presented with 6 practice paragraphs, 112 filler paragraphs, and the 32 experimental paragraphs (half in their predicting versions and half in their control versions). The subject initiated presentation of each paragraph by pressing the space bar on a CRT keyboard in response to a request printed on the CRT screen. Then the paragraph was displayed one sentence at a time. Each sentence remained on the screen until the subject pressed the space bar, then the sentence disappeared, and then, after a 500-ms pause, the next sentence appeared. After the last sentence of the paragraph (and the 500-ms pause), a row of asterisks with a test word underneath it appeared. The subject was instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, pressing the ?/ key if the test word had been in the paragraph, and pressing the Zkey if it had not been. The instruction to press the space bar to begin the next paragraph appeared 500 ms after the subject's response to the test word.
Design. A Latin square combined two groups of subjects (24 per group), 2 sets of pairs of paragraphs (16 per set), and the two experimental conditions: The paragraph read by the subject either did or did not predict the event described by the test word. The experimental paragraphs and the filler paragraphs were mixed in a different random order for every two subjects.
Results
All analyses were based on mean response times for each subject or item in each condition.
For the experimental paragraphs, correct responses to the test word were slower when the event described by the test word was predicted than when it was not, F([, 46) = 8.2, p < .01, with subjects as a random variable, and F\ 1, 30) = 5.2, p < .03, with test words as a random variable. The means were 883 ms and 853 ms, respectively, with a standard error of 7.8 ms. For a predicted test word, there were 6.7% errors, and for a test word not predicted, 6.4%.
For the filler paragraphs, negative test words had a mean correct response time of 863 ms (11.4% errors) and positive test words had a mean correct response time of 833 ms (8.9% errors).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 show that, immediately after a predicting sentence was read, it was somewhat more difficult for subjects to say that the predicted test word had not appeared explicitly in the sentence. There are several interpretations of this finding. One interpretation is that the predicted event was inferred during reading of the sentence and stored in the memory representation of the sentence. Then, when the test word was presented, it closely matched the predicted event (the inference) stored in memory so that a no response was slowed. A second, similar, interpretation is that the predicted event was inferred during reading, but only in a transient manner that did not lead to storage in long-term memory. Slow responses with the predicted test word came about because the transient inference was still in short-term memory at the time of test. These two interpretations are essentially priming explanations; both assume that the predicting sentence activated the meaning of the test word before the test word was actually presented. The third interpretation is quite different; it assumes that there is no prior activation by the predicting sentence, that the effect on the test word occurs after the test word is presented. According to this interpretation, the reason subjects are slow to say that the test word was not in the sentence is that the test word is so compatible with the meaning of the sentence which is still available in short-term memory. For example, a context-checking procedure (Forster, 1981 ) that compared the meaning of dead with the meaning (in short-term memory) of the sentence about someone falling offa roof would produce matches in meaning reflecting the ease with which death could be viewed as a consequence of the fall. Finally, a fourth possible interpretation is that the results represent a combination of priming and context checking. In other words, the predicted event is encoded into memory, so the correct negative response is slowed, and then the response is slowed even more by contextchecking procedures.
Because of these different interpretations, the immediate test does not allow any conclusion about whether the inference was made at the time the predicting sentence was read or at the time the test word was presented. However, an immediate test does allow another, equally important and interesting, conclusion about the sentence and test word viewed as a pair. Because the relation between them leads to difficulty in responding no to the test word, we can assume that the relation would also lead to facilitation in processing in other situations, such as normal reading. For example, if the sentence about falling off the roof were followed by a sentence that said the actress died, then processing of the pair of sentences would be facilitated. Because direct measurement of facilitation in reading time is difficult (see discussions by McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980a , 1984 and Keenan, Baillet, & Brown, 1984) , it may be that an immediate single-word test can be useful in giving an indication of what information would be easy to process next in normal reading. Furthermore, for the purpose of validating materials experimentally, the immediate test can show that an inference apparent to the experimenter is also apparent to subjects, at least under this retrieval condition.
Experiment 2
The procedure used in Experiment 1, immediate test, is one way of assessing the relation between the predicting sentence and test word. Another way is to use a cued-recall procedure. In Experiment 2, subjects read the experimental sentences under instructions to rate each sentence according to how interesting it was. Then, after a delay of about 5 min, they were given an unexpected cued-recall test. The cues consisted of the test words used in Experiment 1. They were asked to write, for each cue, the appropriate sentence from the earlier list.
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 80 students in an introductory psychology course at Northwestern University participating as a course requirement. The materials for this experiment were presented in a booklet including materials for many other experiments. All students participated at the same time, in a large lecture hall. Total time for completion of the various tasks in the booklet was about 2 hr. The materials for this experiment comprised a group of several consecutive pages in some random position in the booklet, with the sentences for the rating task presented on the first page of the group, the intervening tasks (judged to take about 5 min) presented on the next three pages, and the cued-recall task on the last page.
Materials. Twenty-one items, a subset of the experimental materials from Experiment 1, were used. Each item had three versions, the predicting version and the control version used in Experiment 1, and a new version that stated the predicted event explicitly. This new version used exactly the same wording as the predicting version except that words were added to state the predicted event. For example, the new version for the first sentence in Table 1 was "The director and cameraman were ready to shoot close-ups when suddenly the actress fell from the 14th story and died." For each item, the cue for the recall test was the test word used in Experiment 1.
Procedure and design. The three experimental conditions represented the versions of the items used in the rating task: predicting, control, or explicit. These three conditions were crossed with sets of items (7 per set) and groups of subjects in a Latin square, with the number of subjects in each group unequal (31, 22, and 27) . Three different orders of presentation of sentences and cues were used.
Results
A sentence was scored (blind scoring) as recalled if a subject wrote enough of it that we could be sure he or she had the right sentence in mind. Given the overall length of the experimental session and the number of tasks in the booklets, level of recall was not high.
With the predicting and explicit sentences, the cue led to much higher recall than with the control sentences. The means were 23%, 30%, and 4%, respectively. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the means in the Latin square showed a significant difference across these conditions, F{2,4) = 50.5, and a post hoc test showed the difference between the predicting and explicit conditions not quite significant, F(\, 4) = 6.6.
Discussion
The results show clearly that, given the predicting sentence, subjects could use the predicted word as a cue to improve recall even when that word had not been stated explicitly. Following recent arguments (Corbett & Dosher, 1978; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980a , 1980b , 1981 Ratcliff & McKoon, 1978; Singer, 1978) , this finding could be interpreted either as an encoding phenomenon or a retrieval phenomenon. It could be that the inference represented by the test word was made at the time of encoding, and so the cue improves recall because of the match between the memory representation and the cue; or it could be that the inference was made at the time of retrieval, when some process (automatic or strategic) allows the cue to improve the probability of recall of the correct sentence.
The situation with cued recall parallels the situation with immediate test. In neither case can the results indicate whether the event described by the predicted word was inferred at the time the predicting sentence was read. But the results do show that the relation between the sentence and the test word (or cue) is a relation that becomes involved in retrieval, either immediate retrieval as in Experiment 1 or more long-term retrieval as in Experiment 2. This point will be taken up again in the final discussion.
Experiment 3
In previous work, McKoon and Ratcliff(1980a , 1980b , 1981 , 1984 Ratcliff & McKoon, 1978) have argued for speeded item recognition as a procedure to test the memory representation of text. The argument is that priming in this procedure can be shown to involve automatic, not strategic, retrieval processes, and that automatic retrieval processes will reflect the representation of a text encoded into memory at the time of reading. Priming in item recognition (of single words) was used in Experiment 3. There were a series of trials, each with a study phase and an immediately following recognition test phase. In the study phase, two paragraphs were presented; one was an experimental sentence and the other one was a filler. In the test phase, items were presented as prime-target pairs. The prime was either the neutral word, ready, or a word from one of the studied paragraphs, and the target was either a word from one of the studied paragraphs or a word that had not appeared in any paragraph. Subjects were required to decide whether the target had appeared in either of the studied paragraphs. For the experimental sentences, either the predicting or the control version was read, and the target was the word predicted by the predicting version. The hypothesis was that, if the event predicted by a predicting sentence was encoded into memory at the time of reading, then correct (no) responses to the predicted word would be difficult, that is, slow and/or inaccurate.
Method
Subjects. There were 24 subjects, Yale undergraduates, who participated for extra credit in an introductory psychology course.
Materials. The experimental pairs of paragraphs were the same as those used in Experiment I. The filler paragraphs were 32 of the 112 used in Experiment 1, 16 two-sentence paragraphs and 16 three-sentence paragraphs.
For each pair of experimental paragraphs, four test words were chosen. One of these, a negative test word, was the word describing the predicted event, the same word used in Experiments 1 and 2. A second test word was the name of the main character in the paragraphs, and the third and fourth test words were other words from the paragraphs (words used in both paragraphs); these three were positive test words. The filler paragraphs each had four positive test words and two negative test words.
Procedure. Subjects were tested in one 50-min session each. Presentation of all materials and collection of data was controlled by a microcomputer driven by an Apple computer.
Each subject was presented with 3 practice trials, followed by 32 experimental trials. On each trial, there were two paragraphs to study, one experimental and one filler, and six test items.
A trial began with an instruction to the subject, printed on the CRT screen, to press the space bar to initiate the trial. Then the two paragraphs were presented, one at a time. Two-sentence filler paragraphs were presented for 5 s, and three-sentence fillers were presented for 7 s. One-line experimental paragraphs were presented for 4 s, two-line experimental paragraphs were presented for 6 s, and 3-line experimental paragraphs were presented for 8 s. After a paragraph, there was a 2-s pause before the next paragraph was presented. After the pause after the second paragraph, a warning signal that the test list was about to begin was shown for 1.5 s.
Each test item began with a row of +s, shown for 500 ms. Next the +s were replaced by the prime word, shown for 200 ms. Then the prime disappeared, and the test word was displayed on the line below. The test word stayed on the screen until the subject made a response. Then, if the subject had made an error, the word ERROR was displayed for 2,000 ms; otherwise the next test item began after 500 ms. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, pressing the ?/ key if the test word had appeared in one of the paragraphs studied, and the Z key if it had not. After the sixth test item, the instruction to press the space bar to begin the next trial was displayed. Subjects were told to attend to the primes because they might facilitate responding to the test words.
One of the six test words was the word predicted by the predicting version of the experimental paragraph in the study list. It was primed either by the main character in the paragraph or by the word ready. Another of the six items consisted either of two words from the experimental paragraph, one as prime and one as test word (probability, 0.7), or one word from the experimental paragraph, primed by the word ready (probability, 0.3). For the filler paragraph, there were four test items. For two of them, either the prime and test word were both from the paragraph (probability, 0.7), or the prime was the word ready and the test word was from the paragraph (probability, 0.3). For the other two, either the prime was from the paragraph and the test word was not from any paragraph (probability, 0.7), or the prime was the word ready and the test word was not from any paragraph (probability, 0.3). Thus, of the six test items, three required a positive response and three a negative response. No word was repeated in the test list (except for the neutral prime, ready). (The probabilities apply to the experiment as a whole, not to individual test lists.)
A different random order of presentation of paragraphs and test items was used for every second subject. There were two restrictions on a test list: The test word that was predicted by the predicting version of the experimental paragraph could not appear as the first test word, and other words from the experimental paragraph had to appear later in the test list than the predicted word.
Design. Four groups of subjects (6 per group), four sets of materials (8 per set), and the four experimental conditions were combined in a Latin square design. The four experimental conditions reflected whether an experimental paragraph was read in the predicting or control version and whether the test word was primed by a word from the paragraph or the neutral word, ready.
Results
All analyses were based on mean response times or error rates for each subject or item in each condition. Means of these means are shown in Table 2 .
If the test word was primed by a word from the studied paragraph, correct (no) response times for the test word were slower when the predicting version was read than when the control version was read. But if the test word was primed by the neutral word, ready, there was little difference in response times. This interaction was significant for response times, F([, 23) = 14,6, p < .01, with subjects as the random variable, and F(\, 28) = 13.8, p < .01, with test words as the random variable. The main effects of which version was read and whether the prime was a word from the paragraph were not significant, all Fs ^ 3.7. Standard error of the response time means was 14.1 ms.
For error rates, ANOVA showed that there were more errors with the predicting version, F\\, 23) -91.5, p < .01, with subjects as the random variable, and F([, 28) = 23.7, p < .01, with test words as the random variable. The effect of prime (word from the paragraph or ready) was not significant, Fs «S 1.8. The interaction of the two variables was also not significant, Fs < 1. The standard error on the mean error rates was 2.5%.
Reaction times for these errors were 800 ms (predicting, primed by a word from the paragraph), 735 ms (predicting, primed by ready), 826 ms (control, primed by a word from the paragraph), and 838 ms (control, primed by ready). There were no significant differences {SE = 26 ms).
For the other test words from the experimental paragraphs and the test words from the filler paragraphs, response times averaged 765 ms (14.8% errors) for correct yes responses primed by a word from the paragraph, 773 ms (14.1% errors) for correct yes responses primed by the word ready, 783 ms (10.1% errors) for correct no responses primed by a word from a paragraph, and 801 ms (11.4% errors) for correct no responses primed by the word ready.
Discussion
When the prime was a word from the paragraph, the effect of a predicting paragraph was to make responses to the test word more difficult than with a control paragraph. This difficulty was apparent in both response time and accuracy. But with the neutral prime, only accuracy was affected. Although the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between prime and target was in the range usually used to investigate automatic processing, response times were slow for single-word recognition (over 800 ms) and so it is possible that some of them were due to strategic processes. Recognizing the difficulty of some of the targets, subjects might have decided to slow their responses to allow greater accuracy. Thus the errors for the predicted word with the neutral prime might have been the result only of strategic processes. The goal of Experiment 4 was to ensure that all responses were fast enough to be automatic processes, and interpretation of results will be postponed until that experiment has been presented.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 was essentially a replication of Experiment 3 except that a deadline procedure was used. After each target word, subjects were given a signal to tell them exactly when to respond. This signal was given quickly enough that all responses would be fast enough to be described as automatic.
Methods
Subjects. Sixteen subjects participated in the experiment for extra credit in an introductory psychology course at Yale University.
Materials and design. The same materials and design were used as in Experiment 3.
Procedure. The only major difference in procedure from Experiment 3 was that a deadline procedure was used. Subjects were given practice at responding to a deadline with a lexical decision task. Each test item in the lexical decision task began with a row of +s displayed for 500 ms. Then the +s were replaced by a prime, either ready or some other word, displayed for 200 ms. When the prime disappeared, a test letter string appeared on the next line. After the letter string appeared for 250 ms, a row of asterisks was presented below it. Subjects were instructed to respond exactly 300 ms after the asterisks appeared, yes with the ?/ key if the string was a word, no with the 2 key if the string was not a word. After the response, the response time was displayed for the subject for 750 ms. Then, after a 500-ms pause, the next test item began. After every 10th test item, there was an instruction to press the space bar when ready to begin the next 10 items. There were 200 test items altogether. Subjects reported feeling comfortable with the deadline procedure after this much practice.
In the experimental trials, a deadline procedure was used for the test items of each study-test trial as follows: Each test item began with the +s and prime presented in the same way as in Experiment 3 and in the lexical decision practice. Then, 350 ms after the test word was presented, a row of asterisks appeared underneath it. Subjects were instructed, as in the lexical decision practice, to give their response exactly 300 ms after the asterisks, responding yes if the test word had appeared in a studied paragraph, and no if it had not. If the subject made an error, the word ERROR was presented for 600 ms. Response time was displayed just as in the lexical decision practice.
Results
All analyses were based on means for each subject or item in each condition, and means of the means are shown in Table 2 .
Across the four experimental conditions, there were no significant differences in response times for the test words. As expected from the instructions to the subjects, these times averaged about 300 ms (305 ms for positive [error] responses, SE = 13.7 ms, and 315 ms for negative responses, SE = 10.0 ms).
There were, however, significant differences in error rates. With a prime from the studied paragraph, a predicting paragraph led to more errors on the predicted target word than a control paragraph, but with the neutral prime, this difference was much reduced. The interaction was significant with subjects as a random variable, F\\, 15) = 11.8, p < .01, and with items as a random variable, f\ 1,28) = 6.2, p < .01. The main effect of which prime was used was not significant with subjects as a random variable, F(\, 15) = 4.0, but was significant with items as the random variable, F\ 1, 28) = 5.6, p < .05. The main effect of whether the predicting or control paragraph was studied was significant in both analyses, F(U 15) = 33.8, p < .01, and F(l, 28) = 22.8, p < .01. Post hoc tests showed that the difference between number of errors with the predicted and control paragraphs for the neutral prime did not reach significance, F{\ i 15) = 3.2, with subjects as a random variable, and F{ 1,28) = 1.7, with items as a random variable. Standard error for the error rates was 3.4%.
For the other test words from the experimental paragraphs and the test words from the filler paragraphs, response times were again about 300 ms. Error rates were 15% (positive responses primed by a word from the paragraph), 21% (positive responses primed by the word ready), 16% (negative responses primed by a word from a paragraph), and 12% (negative responses primed by ready).
Discussion
When the prime was from the studied paragraph, the results of Experiment 4 replicated those of Experiment 3; responses for the test word were more difficult with the predicting paragraph than with the control paragraph. But, with the neutral prime, the results of the two experiments were different; in Experiment 4, responses for the predicted word were not significantly more difficult for the predicting paragraph than the control paragraph. The difference in results can be attributed to the stricter procedure used in Experiment 4; the deadline forced subjects to give fast responses and so can be reasonably assumed to have eliminated strategic responses that occurred in Experiment 3.
The results of Experiment 4 can be interpreted by hypothesizing that the event represented by the predicted word is encoded only minimally during reading. For example, the encoding of the predicted event for "falling off the 14th story" might be "something bad happened." With only the neutral prime, the test word dead would be unlikely to make contact with this representation in memory. But with the prime from the paragraph, the combination of the prime and information activated by the prime (such as "something bad happened") would lead to some semantic matching between dead (the worst bad thing) and the memory representation. This matching would lead to difficulty with a no response.
The conclusion of Experiments 3 and 4, that implicitly predicted events are encoded into memory in a minimal semantic form, and not encoded into memory explicitly, supports recent work by Singer and Ferreira (1983) . Subjects in their experiments read short stories and then answered yes/no questions about the stories, including questions about implicit predicted events. Singer and Ferreira interpreted their results as showing that their subjects made inferences about predicted events when and only when the sentence predicting the event was followed by a sentence expressing a consequence of the event (the event itself was never stated and so would be an inference). However, there are alternative interpretations of their results. One interpretation would be that the inferences were never made, even when the predicting sentence was followed by the consequence sentence; instead of reflecting priming of the inference during reading, the results would reflect context-checking procedures that were facilitated by the extra information provided by the consequence sentence. Another alternative interpretation would be that the inferences were always made, whether there was a consequence sentence or not, but again the results reflect context checking. The contextchecking process suggested by Forster (1981) requires that the context be immediately available (i.e., in short-term memory). That would be possible in Singer and Ferreira's experiments because all test questions were presented immediately after the story which they tested; there was no delay between story and questions and no intervening unrelated material. Thus, Singer and Ferreira's results do not allow definite conclusions about the encoding of implicit predictable events during reading. But the results of the experiments presented here suggest that, in fact, Singer and Ferreira were correct in thinking that their subjects did not always encode inferences about predicted events.
General Discussion
There are two general issues to be discussed; one concerns the inferences readers make during reading and the other concerns the retrieval conditions under which readers can access or make use of inferred information.
With respect to retrieval conditions, comparison of the three paradigms used in the experiments in this article allows a mapping of the different conclusions that can be drawn from the different paradigms. Although all of these procedures have been used in previous work, here they are used together with the same materials so that comparisons across experiments give extra information about inference processes.
Experiments 3 and 4 used a priming procedure; the conclusion was that implicit predictable events are encoded into memory only minimally. A minimal encoding might represent a few semantic features, such as "something bad" encoded when the predictable event was death. Or it might represent the encoding of a variety of possibilities, such as "badly hurt," "dead," "call for help," or "what happens now." Or a minimal encoding might be an encoding of "dead" suppressed by the information that "dead" was not explicitly stated. Whatever form the minimal encoding takes, it has the characteristics that the test word dead, when presented in the neutral context, is not much more likely to make contact with an encoded predicting paragraph than an encoded control paragraph. However, which paragraph was encoded makes a large difference when dead is combined with a prime from the text. It is as though the prime adds strength or specificity to the minimally encoded features of the predicted event or overrides the "not explicitly stated" information so that contact is made between the encoding and the test word, perhaps making more likely the kind of plausibility judgment suggested byReder(l982).
These minimally encoded inferences about predictable events can be contrasted with inferences that are encoded explicitly or with more strength (such as argument repetition). The most salient dimension of contrast is that the predictable events are not required for integrating the explicitly stated text; they are "forward" inferences in the terminology used by Singer and Ferreira (1983) . The finding that predictable events are inferred only minimally accords well with research mentioned in the introduction to this article. Among the kinds of inferences that are not necessary for integration that readers do not appear to make are many of the inferences predicted by schema theories (Alba & Hasher, 1983 ), inferences to connect thematically similar stories (Seifert et al., in press) , and inferences about the instruments of verbs (Corbett & Dosher, 1978; . Of course, statements about what kinds of inferences readers do or do not make must always be qualified with respect to encoding conditions; Seifert et al. (in press) found that readers did infer connections between thematically similar stories when strategic processing during reading was encouraged.
The results of the priming experiments can be used to better understand the results of the immediate test and cued-recall experiments. One possible interpretation of both the immediate test and cued-recall results was that the predicted event was inferred during reading and explicitly encoded into the memory representation of the text. But the priming results suggest that this was not the case. For immediate test, then, the other two possibilities discussed remain. It could be that the difficulty in responding correctly to a test word describing the predicted event came about because the event was inferred only transiently (not encoded into long-term memory) and was still in short-term memory at the time of test. Or it could be that the difficulty with the test word was due to a context-checking process using the text information available in short-term memory.
For cued recall, neither of the interpretations of the immediate test results can apply. Clearly the delay between study and test in the recall experiment was too long for a transient inference or context information to remain in short-term memory. But a word describing an implicit predicted event did function as an effective cue. This is not a unique result; for example, implicit instruments for explicit verbs have also been found to be good recall cues (Corbett & Dosher, 1978) . The question, then, is by what processes does a cue make contact with the appropriate material in memory?
This problem becomes more puzzling when the cued-recall results are compared to the recognition results. Dead, for example, gave little difficulty in recognition with the neutral prime; that is, there was relatively little difference between the predicting and control conditions. Therefore dead seems to have made only minimal contact with the memory representation of the predicting sentence. Yet it functioned as a retrieval cue and therefore must have made contact with the memory representation. This apparent paradox is reminiscent of encoding specificity; in Tulving and Thomson's (1973) experiments a word could be recalled even though not recognized. Tulving and Thomson attributed this phenomenon to a problem of accessibility; the word was encoded but could be accessed only with a cue that matched encoding conditions. Thus, with that cue, the word could be recalled, but without the cue, the word could not be recognized. Similarly, with a cue from the studied paragraph, dead gave difficulty in recognition, but without the cue, there was little difficulty. However, the analogy with recognition failure of recallable words is not quite appropriate because such words in Tulving and Thomson's experiments (the B members of A-B study pairs) were not the cues for recall but rather the responses and would not, themselves, function as effective cues.
Intuitively, it is puzzling to try to understand how in recall a word can function as a recall cue for a sentence and yet in recognition appear unlikely to make contact with that sentence, and it would seem that the place to turn for clarification of or solution to this puzzle would be current models of recall and recognition. The most recent of these models is the model proposed by Gillund and Shiffrin (1984) . In this model, it is assumed that information is represented in memory in a retrieval structure consisting of the strengths between cues (or probes) and images in memory, where cues can be studied items, general context, or extralist items. The strength between extralist cues and images in memory reflects preexperimental associations and is usually assumed to be lower than the strength between the other kinds of cues and images in memory. For recall, the model assumes a search process that involves a series of cycles, with general context as the cue on the first cycle, and general context plus any retrieved items as the cue on subsequent cycles. For recognition, the model assumes a process by which overall familiarity is assessed between all the images in the retrieval structure and the combination of the context and cue (probe) item.
Gillund and Shiffrin have extended the model to account for performance with double word probes, and this extension can be applied to priming effects. Double items can be tested with subjects responding either to both items or to the target alone and not the prime. In either case, the two items (combined with general context) can be viewed as a compound cue. To account for accuracy data from the case where subjects responded only to the target, Gillund and Shiffrin (1984, p. 38) assumed that the prime was given a smaller weight in the compound than the target (e.g.,. 1 versus .9). Thus, the response to the target reflects the assessment of the familiarity between the weighted compound cue and the images in the retrieval structure.
A second way of accounting for recognition of double items in the Gillund and Shiffrin model would be to add an activation component to the model. The effect of a prime on the memory system would be to activate images with high interitem strengths to the prime. This would provide more strength for the images related to the prime and so increase their familiarity.
The compound cue hypothesis can explain the patterns of data obtained in priming experiments in the following ways. First, responses to a positive word are faster and more accurate if the prime is from the same paragraph than if it is from a different paragraph. This is because the interitem strengths between two words from the same paragraph would be higher, leading to a higher familiarity value. Second, the assessed familiarity of a compound cue for which the prime was from a recently studied paragraph would be higher than the assessed familiarity of a compound for which the prime was neutral (ready). Thus, a prime from a paragraph would give higher accuracy for positive targets and lower accuracy for negative targets, as is shown by the filler test items in Experiment 4. Third, the familiarity of the compound cues made up of a prime from the target and a word representing a predicted event (e.g., actress-dead) would be high enough to give inaccurate performance because the strength of the prime would combine with the strength of the target. The target's strength would come from its similarity to the information encoded in memory, that is, its similarity to the minimally encoded inference.
The activation hypothesis can explain the same patterns of data. A prime from a studied paragraph activates and therefore increases the familiarity of related items in the memory structure. These related items would include positive targets and the negative test words representing the predicted events. A prime from a studied paragraph would also increase the strengths of all the images in the memory structure through shared context, and so increase familiarity values relative to the neutral prime.
In sum, either the compound cue hypothesis or the activation hypothesis would allow the Gillund and Shiffrin model to account for the recognition data of Experiments 3 and 4. For recall (Experiment 2), when the cue was the predicted event, the first cycle of the search process would use the cue as context. Because there was little difficulty in recognition with dead in the neutral condition, the strength in the retrieval structure between dead and the studied sentence must be low; therefore retrieval of the sentence would be unlikely. Furthermore, if there was no retrieval, there would be no extra cues to use in the following cycles, and it would be unlikely that retrieval would ever result. It appears then that the current results require some elaboration of the Gillund and Shiffrin model.
One obvious elaboration suggests itself, and that is that the subject him or herself rather than the retrieval structure provides further cues for cycles after the first cycle. These cues could be generated by an analysis of the meaning of the original cue. For example, for dead a further cue might be "How might someone die?" or "Death is a bad thing." Then the probability of retrieval of the studied sentence would reflect the extralist, preexperimental semantic associative strength between this new cue and the studied sentence. We think that this strength could be high enough to lead to recall of the studied sentence, although, in the absence of supporting empirical evidence, we make this suggestion tentatively.
With this elaboration, the Gillund and Shiffrin (1984) model would provide a complete account of the recall and recognition data. For recognition, the presence of a prime would increase the familiarity value of the test word, leading to increased difficulty in the predicting condition. For recall, the additional elaboration provided by the subject for the cue would allow retrieval.
The conclusion of this article with respect to inference processes is that different retrieval conditions can point to different ways in which inferences are encoded. Some kinds of inferences (e.g., argument repetition) may be encoded into memory explicitly, and thus be available to retrieval processes in the same way as explicitly stated information. But other kinds of inferences, like those examined in this article, may be encoded only minimally and so are likely to be retrieved only by processes that make use of additional information.
With respect to retrieval conditions, the conclusion of this article is that each condition allows different aspects of inference processes to be studied. Priming in item recognition can be used to look at the long-term memory representation of a text to determine the extent to which an inference was encoded into memory at the time of reading and to determine fast automatic means of access into the memory representation. Immediate test can be used to measure the relation between explicit textual information and possible inferences in a context where both text and test information are present simultaneously in short-term memory. Finally, cued recall can be used to investigate the facility with which elaboration processes can generate an inference given a cue to long-term memory. In sum, the different conclusions drawn from these three procedures point to the importance of research on the retrieval structures of textual information and the processes that operate on those structures.
19B. John was excited as he left the car near the woods outside Indianapolis; today, his uncle was teaching him to track and hunt, RACE 20A. When the troubled sister asked the father what she should do, the father said, "All yon can do is to get down on your knees." PRAY 20B. The boxer told his father and sister he was troubled about tonight's fight; his knees were weak and his opponent might knock him out.
PRAY
21A. At the ball, the teenager shyly bowed and stuttered something unintelligible when introduced to the girl, DANCE 21B. When the ball hit the girl, the teenager shyly bowed down to pick it up, and stuttered something unintelligible, DANCE 22A. When Mildred, a Las Vegas salesgirl, carelessly dropped her cigarette near the woods, the result was tragic, FIRE 22B. Mildred, a Las Vegas cigarette salesgirl, was driving carelessly one night, and tragically crashed her car into the woods. FIRE 23A. The trapeze artist was usually very good, and attracted large crowds, but as tonight's audience watched he suddenly lost his grip, FALL 23B. The artist tightened his grip on the paint brush and began an exciting depiction of the trapeze act. FALL 24A. After breakfast, Henry got his lawnmower out of the garage and surveyed the yard, CUT 24B. Henry used his father's lawnmower motor to make a go-cart to race around the yard. CUT 25A. The room was much sunnier than he liked, so the decorator walked over to the blinds, CLOSE 25B. The decorator sat down amidst the boxes of wallpaper, blinds, and paints, sunning himself and contemplating the room. CLOSE 26A. With McEnroe poised to return, Connors bounced the ball once then tossed it straight up as he drew back his racket, SERVE 26B. Victorious, Connors tossed the ball and racket into the stands as McEnroe returned to the net to shake hands, SERVE 27A. "Here we go again!" said the sports announcer as the goalie and the other angry hockey player headed for each other, FIGHT 27B. The sports announcer praised the goalie and the other hockey player for patience with kids in the camp; they never got angry, they just said, "Let's try again." FIGHT 28A. With his exam coming up, the student opened his book, STUDY 28B. When he finished the test, the student closed his exam book, STUDY 29A. After locating the cavity, the dentist told John to open his mouth.
DRILL
29B. John opened his mouth for the dentist, but there were no cavities.
30A. As the Boeing airplane approached the left side of the mountain, the passengers began to scream. CRASH 30B. The passengers went to the left side of the parked airplane; they could see people screaming at each other, CRASH 31 A. As the torrential rains came down, Sandy worried that her basement apartment and all her lovely furnishings were in jeopardy, FLOOD 31B. As it rained outside, Sandy sat in her basement apartment, crying torrents of tears for her husband, whose life was in jeopardy. FLOOD 32A. The angry wife could not hold her temper against her husband so she picked up a knife, STAB 32B. The husband and wife wanted to finish the cheese, but were angry that their cheese knife was broken again, STAB 
